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[So F. No. 22510. In Bank. Feb. 1,1968.]

THE PEOPLE ex reI. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MERCED COUNTY, Respondent; ROY L. RODONI
et at, Real Parties in Interest.
[la-Ie] Eminent Domain-Uses-Excess CQndemnation-To Avoid
Excessive Damages: Mandamus.-Mandate must issue to compel the trial court to proceed with that part of the Department
of Public Works' suit seeking to condemn, for purposes of
public "ecOnomy under Sts. & Hy. Code, § 104.1, 54 acres of
a farmcr's land that would be left landlocked by an associated condemnation, for highway purposes, of 0.65 acres of
his land, where the record suggested that the entire parcel
could probably be condemned for little more than the cost
of taking the part needed for the highway and of paying
damages for the remainder; but the excess condemnation
must be denied unless justified by the avoidance of excessive
severance or consequential damages.
[2] Id.-Uses-Province to Determine.-It is for the Legislature
to determine what shan be deemed a public use for the pur[1] Right to condemn property in excess of needs for a particular public purpose, note, 6 A.L.R.3d 297. See also Cal.J'ur.2d,
Eminent Domain, §§ 8, 105; Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 115.
MeR. Dig. References:" [1] Eminent Domain, §§ 31.5, 184;
Streets, § 16; Highways, § 43; [2] Eminent Domain, § 14; [3]
Eminent Domain, §§ 2, 31.1; [4] Eminent Domain, §§ 31.3, 31.5;
Streets, § 15; Highways, § 44; [5] Eminent Domain, § 31.5; Streets,
§ 15; Highways, § 44; [6] Eminent Domain, § 31.1; Streets, § 15;
Highways, § 44; [7] Eminent Domain, § 6; Constitutional Law,
§ 85; [8] Eminent Domain, § 27; Streets, § 15; Highways, § 44;
[9] Eminent Domain, § 14; Streets, § 15; Highways, § 55.5; [10]
Eminent Domain, § 31.7; Streets, § 16; Highways, § 49.
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[8]

[9]

poses of eminent domain, and its judgment is binding unless
there is no possibility that the legislation may be for t.he
welfare of the public.
Id.-Nature of Right: Excess Condemnation. - Eminent domain being an inherent attribute of sovereignty, constitutional provisions relating thereto merely place limitations 011
its exercise. Thus, Cal. Const., art. I, § 14%, while expressly
limiting excess condemnations for protective purposes, in no
way limits the power of the Legislature to authorize cxcess
condemnations for other than protective purposes.
1d.-Use5-Excess Condemnation-Remnants: To Avoid Excessive Da.mages.-Despite its broad statutory language, Sts.
& Hy Code, § 104.1, may reasonably be interpreted to authorize only those excess condemnations that. are valid for public
uses, namely, condemnation of remnants, 01' condcmnations
to avoid a substantial risk of excessive seVC1·ance 01' consequential damages.
Id.-Use5-Excess Condemnation-To Avoid Excessive Dam&ges.-Cal. Const., art. I, § 14, prccludes excess condcmnations
under Sts. & Hy. Code, § 104.1, unless the economic benefit t<>
the state is clear, and the mere avoidance of the cost of litigating damages claimed by the condemnee is not sufficient j nor
does the state authorize condemnations for the sole purpOIlP
of toking lands enhanced by the improvement in order to
recoup thot increase in value, or for the sole purpose 01
developing the area adjacent to the improvement for a proht.
Id.-Uses-Excess Condemnation.-Sts. & Hy. Code, § 104.1,
providing for excess condemnation, is not an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, since the statute contains adequate standards for the guidance of the agency, and the conditions in Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 102, 103 and 104, themselves
providing adequate standards governing the necessity of such
condemnations, have first to be met.
Id.-Who May Exercise-Delegation.-The power of eminent
domain may be delegated by the Legislature to an administrative body as long as the delegating statute establishes an
ascertainable standard to guide the administrative agents.
Id. - Uses - Province to Determine Necessity. - Sts. & Hy.
Code, § 103, by making conclusive the determination of the
Highway Commission on the necessity of taking particular
land, thus taking such issue outside the scope of judicial review,
does not infringe the constitutional rights of thc condemnec.
Id.-Uses-Province to Determine What Is a Public Use.-

-------------_._-----------

[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 9; Am.Jur.2d, Eminent
Domain, §§ ::!,7.
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The issue of whether a taking of particular land under the
Streets and Highways Code is for a public use is within the
scope of judicial review.
[10] Id. - Uses - Excess Condemnation - Evidence.-To raise an
issue of improper excess taking in eminent domain, the condemnees must show that the condemner is guilty of fraud,
bad faith or abuse of discretion in the sense that the condemner
does not actually intend to use the property as it resolved to
use it, or that the contemplated use is not a public one.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Merced County to proceed with the condemnation of three
instead of two parcels of real property owned by the real
parties in interest. Writ granted.
Harry S. Fenton, Holloway Jones, Jack M. Howard, William C. DeMartini, Charles E. Spencer, Jr., and William R.
Edgar for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, and Robert L. Bergman, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Petitioner.
Linneman, Burgess, TeBes & Van Atta, L. M. Linneman
and James E. Linneman for Real Parties in Interest.
Fadem & Kanner and Gideon Kanner as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-The Department of Public Works seeks
to compel the trial court to proceed with the condemnation of
three instead of two parcels of real property owned by the
real parties in interest, Roy and Thelma Rodoni.
The department built a freeway across a farm owned by the
Rodonis. The farm consists of a southern rectangular parcel
and a northern triangular parcel. The northeast corner of the
former touches the southwest corner of the latter. The freeway crosses the adjoining corners, taking a tip of each, which
total .65 acres. As a result, the northern parcel of approximately 54 acres is landlocked.
In addition to the .65 acres the freeway occupies, the
department seeks to condemn the remaining landlocked 54
acres pursuant to Streets and Highways Code section 104.1.1
Its purpose is to protect the fisc by eliminating the risk that
l' 'Whenever a part of a pareel of land is to be taken for State highway purposes and the remainder is to be left in such shape or condition

as to be of little value to ita owner, or to give rise to claims or litigation
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excessive severance damages to the landlocked parcel might be
awarded for the taking of the corner that provided access to
it. The department points out that if it is allowed to condemn
the entire parcel the Rodonis will receive full value for their
property, the risk of excessive severance damages will be eliminated, and ultimately it will be able to reduce the cost of the
freeway by selling the part of the parcel not needed for
freeway purposes.
The Rodonis challenge the excess condemnation on the
ground that taking property for such a purely economic purpose violates article I, section 14 of the California Constitution 2 because such taking is not for a "public use." They
contend that excess condemnation must be limited to parcels
that may properly be deemed remnants with respect to which
the public interest in avoiding fragmented ownership comes
into play. In their view, 54 acres, even if landlocked and of
little value, cannot be deemed a remnant of .65 acres. They
insist that the state pay severance damages for the landlocked
parcel and allow them to retain it, even though severance
damages may be equal to its full original market value. They
also assert that the excess condemnation is prohibited by section 14% of article I of the California ConstitutionS because
it is not limited to land lying within 200 feet of the freeway.
The trial court decided in favor of the Rodonis and ordered
the complaint dismissed insofar as it seeks to condemn the
landlocked parcel. It held that to allow the taking of any land
eoneerning severance or other damage, the department may acquire the
whole parcel and may Bell the remainder or may exchange the same for
other property needed for State highway purposes."
2California Constitution article I, section 14: "Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having
first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner . . . . "
3" The State, or any of its cities or counties, may acquire by gift, purehase or condemnation, lands for establishing, laying out, widening, enlarging, extending, and maintaining memorial grounds, streets, squares,
parkways and reservations in and about and along and leading to any or
all of the same, providing land so acquired shall be limited to parcels
lying wholly or in part within a distance not to exceed one hundred fifty
feet from the closest boundary of Buch public works or improvements;
provided, that when parcels which lie only partially within said limit of
one hundred fifty feet only such portions may be acquired which do not
exceed two hundred feet from said closest boundary, and after the establishment, laying out and completion of such improvements, may convey
any such real estate thUB acquired and not necessary for such improvements, with reservations concerning the future use and occupation of such
real estate so aR to protect sucp public works and improvements and their
environs and to preserve the view, appearance, light, air and usefulness
of Buch public works.
"The Le'l'islllture may, by statute, prescribe procedure."

i
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not physically necessary for the freeway would be a taking
for other than the public use and that if section 104.1 were
construed to allow such a taking it would be unconstitutional.
The department then petitioned for a writ of mandate ordering the Merced County Superior Court to proceed with the
trial of the original complaint or in the alternative for a writ
of prohibition forbidding the court from proceeding in
accordance with its order dismissing the complaint in part.
(See Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1955) 43
Cal.2d 815 [279 P.2d 35] ; Pinancial lrulem. Co. v. Superior
Court (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 395, 399 [289 P.2d 233] ; People ex
reI. Dept. Public Works v. Rodoni (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 771
[52 Cal.Rptr. 857].)
[Ia] We hold that section 104.1 validly authorizes the
trial court to procee.d with the action to condemn the 54 acres.
We also hold, however, that it must refuse to condemn the
property if it· finds that the taking is not justified to avoid
excessive severance or consequential damages. The latter holding will assure that any excess tHking will be for a public use
and preclude the department from using the power of excess
condemnation as a weapon to seeure favorable settlements.
[2] It is for the Legislature to determine what shall be
deemed a public use for the purposes of eminent domain, and
its judgment is binding unless there is no " 'possibility the
legislation may be for the welfare of the public.'" (Linggi
v. Garovotti (1955) 45 Cal.2d 20, 24 [286 P .2d 15], quoting
University of Southern Cal. v. Robbins (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d
523, 525-526 [37 P.2d 163] ; see also Housing Authority v.
Dockweiler (1939) 14 Ca1.2d 437, 449-450 [94 P.2d 794] ; Lux
v. Haggin (1886) 69 Cal. 255, 303-304 [4 P. 919, 10 P. 674] ;
County of Los Angeles v. Anthony (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d
103, 106 [36 Cal.Rptr. 308] ; Tuolumne Water Power Co. v.
P"ederick (1910) 13 Cal.App. 498, 503 [llO P. 134].) "Any
departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts
deciding on what is and is not a governmental fUIlction and in
tllCir invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that
question at the moment of decision, a practice which has
proved impracticable in other fields." (United States ex reI.
T.V.A. v. Welch (1946) 327 U.S. 546, 552 [90 L.Ed. 843, 848,
66 S.Ct. 715].)
Sections 104.1, 104.2, 104.3 and 104.6 of the Streets and
Highways Code set forth the purposes for which the department may acquire or condemn property not immediately
needed or property 110t physically needed for state highway
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purposes. In addition to the excess condemnation authorized
by section 104.1, the department may condemn property for
nonhighway public uses to be exchanged for property already
devoted to such nonhighway uses when the department wishes
to acquire the latter property for highway use. (§ 104.2) 4 It
may condemn property adjacent to highways and other public
works to be constructed by it and thereafter convey the adjacent property to private parties subject to restrictions
protecting the highway or other public use. (§ 104.3.) Ii It
may also acquire property for future needs and lease such
property until it is needed. (§ 104.6.)6 None of these sections
limits the others, and each •• is a distinct and separate authorization." (§ 104.7.)
Section 104.3 is patterned after section 14% of article I of
the California Constitution and, like that section, limits the
property to be taken for protective purposes to property lying
within 200 feet of the public work. It may be assumed without
deciding that the constitutional provision compelled the statutory limitation; that the reference to streets in section 14%
includes state highways and that protective condemnations
/.J.

"

)

""Whenevel' property which is devoted to or held for some other public
use for which the power of eminent domain might be exercised is to be
taken for State highway purposes, the department may, with the consent
of the person or agency in charge of such other public use, condemn, in
the namc of the people of the State of California, real property to be
exchanged with such person or agency for the real property so to be
taken for State highway purposes. This section does not limit the authori.
sation to the department to acquire, other than by condemnation, property for such purposes."
6" The department may condemn real property or any interest therein
for reservations in and about and along and leading to any State highway or other public work or improvement constructed or to be constructed
by the department and may, after the establishment, laying out and completion of such improvement, convey out [sic] any such real property or
interest therein thus acquired and not necessary for such improvement
with reservations concerning the future use and occupation of such rllal
property or interest therein, so as to protect such public work and improvement and its environs and to preserve the view, appearance, light,
air and usefulness of such public work; provided, that land so condemned
under authority of this section shall be limited to parcels lying wholly
. or in part within a dist.ance of not to exceed one hundred fifty feet from
the closest boundary of such public work or improvement; provided that
when parcels whieh lie only partially within such limit of Ol1e hundred
fifty feet are taken, only SUell portions may be condemned which do not
exceed two hundred feet from said closest boundary."
6" The authority conferred by this code to acquire real property for
state highway purposes includes authority to acquire for future needs.
The department is authorized to lease any lands which are held for state
highway purposes and are not presently needed therefor on sucb terms
and conditions as the director may fix and to maintain and care for such
property in order to secure rent therefrom .••. ' I
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authorized by section 14lh are also limited by it. [3] Section 14lh, however, does not limit the power of the Legislature to authorize excess condemnation for other than
protective purposes. "Because eminent domain is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, constitutional provisions merely
place limitations upon its exercise." (People ex rel Dept. of
Public Works v. Ohevalier (1959) 52 Cal.2d 299, 3(» [340
P.2d 598].)
.
Section 14lh was adopted in 1928 at a time when the validity of any excess condemnation was doubtful. It was not
adopted to limit the power of eminent domain but to authorize
condemnations that its sponsors believed would not be permitted under then current rules of constitutional law. (1928
Ballot Pamphlet, Argument for Proposed Senate Constitutional Amend. No. 16.) Althougb it includes limitations on
tbe condemnations it autborizes and to that extent limits the
state's inherent power of eminent dom~in, it in no way limits
those condemnations that it does not ~uthorize. Accordingly,
since it only authorizes condemnations for protective purposes, it does not restrict condemnations for other purposes.
(People ex ret Dept. of Public Works v. Garden Grove Farms
(1965) 231 CaI.App.2d 666, 668-673 [42 Cal.Rptr. 118]; see
also State ex reI. Highway Oom. v. Ourtis (1949) 359 Mo. 402
[222 S.W.2d 64] ; State ex reI. Thomson v. Giessel (1955) 271
Wis. 15, 51-54 [72 N.W.2d 577, 595-597] ; State ex reI. Evjue
v. Seybcrth (1960) 9Wis.2d 274, 279-281 [101 N.W.2d 118,
121-122].)
[4] In seetion 104.1 the Legislature has determined that
excess condemnation is for a public use whenever remaining
parcels are of little value or in such a condition as to give rise
to claims or litigation concerning severance or other damages.
Although the statutory language is broad, it may reasonably
be interpreted to authorize only those excess condemnations
that are for valid public uses; namely, condemnation of remnants (see e.g., Kern Oounty IIigh School Disl. v. McDonald
(1919) 180 Cal. 7, 16 [179 P. 180] ; People v. Thomas (1952)
108 Ca1.App.2d 832, 836 [239 P.2d 914] ; In re Opinion of
Justices (1910) 204 Mass. 616,619-620 [91 N.E. 578]; 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1963) § 7.5122 [1], p. 717) or
condemnations that avoid a substantial risk of excessive severance or consequential damages. On the record before us, the
taking in the present case is justified on the latter ground.
Although a parcel of 54 landlocked acres is not a physical
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remnant, it is a financial remnant: its value as a landlocked
parcel is such that severance damages might equal its value.
Remnant takings have long been considered proper. "The reasoning behind the 'remnant theory,' . . . is that by limiting
the acquisition to only such parts of the property as are
needed by the particular improvement, fragments of lots
would remain of such shape and size as to render them separately valueless, with the result that the city would be
required to pay for the whole, although it took only a part,
and with the further result that because of the lack of such
value, the city would thereafter be deprived of collecting
taxes on these remnants." (Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 297, 317
(1966) ; see also, 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1963)
§ 75122 [1] p. 718.) There is no reason to restrict this theory
to the taking of parcels negligible in size and to refuse to
apply it to parcels negligible in value.
[lb] In the present case the entire parcel can probably be
condemned for little more than the cost of taking the part
needed for the highway and paying damages for the remainder. It is sound economy for the state to take the entire parcel
to minimize ultimate costs.
!
Under these circumstances excess condemnation is constitutional. "The cost of public projects is a relevant element in
all of them, and the Government, just as anyone else, is not
required to proceed oblivious to elements of costs. [Citations.]
~ And when serious problems are created by its public projects,
the Government is not barred from making a common sense
adjustment in the interest of all the public." (United States
ex reI. T. V.A. v. Welch, supra, 327 U.S. 546, 554 [90 L.Ed.
843, 849] ; see also United States v. Agee (6th Cir. 1963) 322
F.2d 139; Boston v. Talbot (1910) 206 Mass. 82, 89 [91 N.E.
1014]; New Products Oorp. v. State Highway Oomr. (1958)
352 Mich. 73, 86 [88 N.W.2d 528] ; Kern Oounty High School
Dist. v. McDonald, supra, 180 Cal. 7, 16; People v. Thomas,
supra,'108 Cal.App.2d 832,836.)
[6] We need not decide in what specific cases other than
those mentioned the statute authorizes excess condemnation.
It should be emphasized, however, that the economic benefit to
the state must be clear. The economic benefit of avoiding the
cost of litigating damages is not sufficient. The statute does
not authorize excess condemnation anytime the condemnee
claims severance or consequential damages. To allow such
condemnation would nullify the constitutional guarantee of

)
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just compensation (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14) by permitting the
state to threaten excess condemnation, not because it was economically sound, but to coerce condemnees into accepting
whatever value the state offered for the property actually
taken or waiving severance or eonsequential damages to avoid
an excess taking. 7
[6] .AB so construed section 104.1 is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Adequate standards
appear in other provisions of the code. Section 102 of the
Streets and Highways Code requires the Highway Commission, before authorizing condemnation by the department of
any real estate for highway purposes, to make a determination
that the "public interest and necessity require the acquisition" and. that "the real property or interest therein
described in such resolution is necessary for the improvement. "8 Section 103 makes the decision of the commission on
the necessity of the improvement and of the taking of given
property conclusive.s Section 104 provides a nonexclusive list
of various purposes for which property is deemed necessa1'f.l0
7Nor does section 104.1 authorize excess eondemnation for recoupment
purposes, as the term is used in those esses that disfavor it. The statute
does not authorize the state to eondemn for the sole purpose of taking
lands enhanced by the improvement in order to reeoup that inerease in
value or for the sole purpos!! of developing the area adjacent to the improvement for a profit. (See Annot., 6 A.L.R.Sd 297, 311-314.) The department's purpose is to avoid the windfall to the condemnee and the
substantial loss to the state that results wIlen severance damages to a
scvercd parcel are equal to its value.
8Streets and Highways Code section 102: "In the. name of the people
of the State of California, tlle department may condemn for State highway purposes, under the provisions of tlle Code of Civil Procedure relating to eminent domain, auy real property or interest therein which it is
authorized to acquire. The department shall not commence any such
proceeding in eminent domain unless the commission first adopts a resolution declaring that public interest and necessity require the acquisition,
construction or completion by the State, acting through the department,
of the improvement for which the resl property or interest tllerein is
required and that the real property or interest therein described in such
resolution is necessary for the improvement."
0Streets and Highways Code section 103: "The resolution of the commission shall be conclusive evidence: (a) Of the public necessity of such
proposed public improvement. (b) That such real property or interest
tllerein is necessary therefor. (c) That such proposed public improvement is plamled or located in a manner which will be most compatible
with the greatest public good and the least private injury."
10Streets and Highways Code section 104: "The department may
acquire, either in fee or in any lesser estate or interest, any real property
which it considers necessary for State highway purposes. Real property
for SUell purposes includes, but is not limited to, real property considered
necessary for any of the following purposes: [Herein are listed such
purposes as rights of way, offices, parks adjoining the higbway, landscaping, drainage, maintellunco, etc.] " .
.... -/.
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Only after these other conditions are met does section 104.1
come into play.
[7] The power of eminent domain may be delegated by
the Legislature to administrative bodies. (Holloway v. Purcell
(1950) 35 Ca1.2d 220, 231 [217 P.2d 665].) Discretion canllot
be absolute, but "if the delegating statute establishes an
ascertainable standard to guide the administrative agents no
objection can properly be made to it." (Wotton v. Bush
(1953) 41 Cal.2d 460, 468 [261 P.2d 256].) In the Holloway
case we held that standards found in Streets and Highways
Code section 100.2 governing the discretion of the State Highway Commission in fixing the location of freeways were sufficiently definite. Section 100.2 authorizes the commission to
approve the location of freeways whenever that location "in
its opinion will best subserve the public interest." The standards found in section 104.1 are no less definite, and are
similarly constitutional.
[8] The question remains of the scope of review of the
department's decision to condemn excess property. Section
103 of the Streets and Highways Code makes the determination of the Highway Commission conclusive on the necessity
of taking particular land. If thc taking is for a public use and
just compensation is paid, no constitutional rights of the condemnee are infringed by making the issue of necessity
nonjusticiable. (People ex reI. Dept. of Public lVorks v. Ohevalier, supra, 52 Cal.2d 299; see also Rindge 00. v. Oounty of
Los Angeles (1923) 262 U.S. 700, 708-710 [67 L.Ed. 1186,
1193-1194,43 S.Ct. 689].)
[9] The issue of whether a taking is for a public use,
however, is justiciable. (People ex reI. Dept. of Public 1VO1'ks
v. Ohevalier, supra, 52 Cal.2d 299.) The distinction between
the scope of review of the questions of public use and necessity was properly recognized in People ex reI. Dept. of Public
Works v. Lagiss (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 23, 39 [35 Ca1.Rptr.
554] : "The necessity for the construction of a highway at the
place designated and in the manner determined by the Commission, together with the amount of land required therefor,
are matters which were conclusively established by the adoption of the resolution [of necessity]. The question as to
whether the land was to be devoted to a public use, however,
. as distinguished from private purposes or to accomplish some
purpose which is not public in character, became a proper

)
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issue for the judicial determination of the court." [10] To
raise an issue of improper excess taking, condemnees must
show that the condemner is guilty of "fraud, bad faith, or
abuse of discretion in the sense that the condemner does not
actually intend to use the property as it resolved to use it"
(People ex reI. Dept. of Public Works v. Chevalier, supra, 52
Ca1.2d 299, 304), or that the contemplated use is not a public
one (see also People ex reI. Dept. of Public Works v. Lagiss,
supra, 223 Cal.App.2d 23, 35-44; Yeshiva Torath Emeth
Academy v. University of Southern Cal. (1962) 208 Cal.App.
2d 618, 619-620 [25 CaI.Rptr. 422] ; County of San Mateo v.
Bartole (1960) 184 Ca1.App.2d 422, 430-434 [7 Cal.Rptr.
569] ; People ex reI. Dept. of Public Works v. Nahabedian
(1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 302, 306-309 [340 P.2d 1053]).
[1c] WheR, as in this case, the property is not needed for
the physical construction of the public improvement, the question of public use turns on a determination of whether the
taking is justified t(l avoid excessive severance or consequential damages. Accordingly, if the court determines that the
excess condemnation is not so justified, it must find that it is
not for a public use.
Let a writ of mandate issue ordering the trial court to
proceed with the trial of the case under the original complaint
in accordance with the views expressed herein.
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
MOSK, J.-I dissent.
Whenever an illustration of the voracious appetite of
acquisitive government is desired, the action of the public
agency here will serve well as Exhibit A:
To state the facts is to decide the case. Needing slightly
more than a half acre for a public use (65/100 of an acre, to
be precise), this governmental department seeks to take 54.03
acres of private property which it does not need and cannot
use. Its avowed purpose is to speculate on resale to a private
purchaser.
No further discussion should be required to decide that the
proposed condemnation is improper. Yet the agency advances
a strange latter-day economics theory that taking more costs
less, and cites as authority Streets and Highways Code section
104.1. If the section purports to grant any such power to the
state, it is clearly in conflict with article I, section 14, of. the
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California Constitution, which provides that "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for p'llblic use without just
compensation having first been made to, or paid into court
for, the owner. . . . " (Italics added.) Clearly no public use
is involved in the taking of the 54 acres, for the land is
admittedly more than 83 times in excess of that actually
required for highway purposes.
Section 104.1, upon which the state relies, provides that
"Wherever a part of a parcel of land is to be taken for state
highway purposes and the remainder is to be left in such
shape or condition as to be of little value to its owner, or to
give rise to claims or litigation concerning severance or other
damage, the department may acquire the whole parcel and
may sell the remainder or may exchange the same for other
property needed for state highway purposes."
A statute must be given a reasonable interpretation. (People v. Murata (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 1, 7 [9 Cal.Rptr. 601, 357 P.2d
833], and cases cited.) It seems clear that when the Legislature adopted the foregoing section referring to ' 'the
remainder" after a taking, it contemplated situations in
which an insignificant remnant might remain. As a leading
authority explains, it is "not an uncommon provision in the
statutes relating to the laying out and widening of highways
in force in the cities in which such conditions exist that, when
part of a parcel of land is taken and the remainder is left in
such condition or in such a shape as to be of little value to its
owner, the city may take the whole and use or sell what it
does not need for the highway, it being felt that it will be less
expensive in the end for the city to take and pay for the
whole of such lots and either to devote the remnants to municipal purposes, or, by consolidating contiguous remnants, sell
them for a fair price, than to engage in protracted litigation
over the question of damages to the remaining land with each
owner. If the owner consents or if the statute provides merely
that he may surrender the whole tract if he chooses, no constitutional objections can arise. for such a proceeding doubtless
tends to save the public money; but, if the owner insists upon
keeping what is left of his land, grave constitutional difficulties would be encountered if it was attempted to compel him
to part with it. Construing such a statute as limited in its
application to trifting and almost negligible remnants which
would be unsuitable for private use after the part actually

218

PEOPLE EX BEL. DEPT. PUB. WKS. V.
SUPERIOR COURT

[68 C.2d

needcd for public usc had been appropriated, it would probably be sustainec1 in some jurisdictions at least as authorizing
a taking for a purpose rcasonilbly incidental to the laying out
of public ways. Howcver, if thc proposed taking savored at all
of a municipal land spccmlation, no court would hesitate to
hold it unconstitutional." (Italics added; footnotes omitted.)
(2 Nichols on Emincnt Domain (3d ed. 1963) § 7.5122(1), pp.
718-719.)
.
Such a "trifling and almost negligiblc remnant" could
result, for example, from a talcing of 54 acres leaving an
irregular half-acre residue; but to reverse that ratio, and
deem 54 acres to be the remainder of a half acre, is truly a
case of the tail wagging tIle dog.
The majority concede that tIle parcel of 54 acres here is not
a physical remnant. That should end the lawsuit. But then
they advance. a novel theory, neither urged by the parties nor
supported by authority, that "remnant" refers not only to
geography but also to value.
If so, an inevitable query follows: "Value to whom'" Section 104.1 malces it crystal clear that the criterion is not value
to thc state, as the majority erroncously assume; to justify
taking, the remainder must be "of little value to its owner."
By his resistance the owner here demonstrates that to him
there is more than "little value" in the 54 acres: Even if the
owncr did not so contend, however, tIle court may take judicial notice that in the context of California's current
popUlation explosion, no 54-acre parcel in the state is without
ascendant value. In the case at bench the purported "little
value" of the 54 acres is attributed to the resultant landlocked condition of the property. Without deciding whether
any property need remain totany inaceessible, property in a
landlocked condition may readily become marketably valuable
merely by acquisition of an easement for access, or by annexation of or to adjacent property.
The second clause of section 104.1 suggests that the excess
taking must provide a benefit to the state. Without pursuing
the dubious constitutional aspect of that overly broad provision, in this instance its application is fallacious: so long as
just compensation for the taking must be paid, by condemning over 83 times more property than it needs, a fortiori the
state is paying morc than it must necessarily pay.
.
The theory of the agency is that by taking the land not
required for public use, assertedly of little value, it will

Feb. 196B]

PEOPLE EX REL. DEPT. PUB. WKS. tI.

219

SUPERIOR COURT
[18 C.1d 206; 85 Cal.llptr. 842, 436 P.2d 8421

recoup by resale. 1 But there is no repeal of the basic laws of
the marketplace when the state becomes a vendor. If the land
is truly of little value, the state will obtain little return by
way of sale. Thus, there is no significant benefit to the state,
as required by the statute, in depriving the owner of his property.
Nevertheless, the majority insist that "The entire parcel
can probably be condemned for little more than the cost of
taking the part needed for the highway and paying damages
for the remainder. It is sound economy for the state to take
the entire parcel to minimize ultimate costs," and again
later, the majority stress "that the economic benefit to the
state must be clear." While as indicated above, I doubt there
is clear economic benefit to the .state from this excessive taking, fundamentally I find the concept of economy, rather than
public use or public purpose,2 to be a unique and unsupportable rationalization to justify the seizure of an individual's
private property.s The state relies heavily on United States ex
reI. T.V.A. v. Welch (1945) 327 U.S. 546 [90 L.Ed. 843, 66
S.Ct. 715], in which 6,000 acres beyond that needed for dam
purposes were taken, and the court there referred to "a common sense adjustment." Factually, however, the case offers
no guidance to us, for the excess land was not resold but was
adapted to public recreational purposes, authority for which
was specifically provided in the T.V.A. act.
What constitutes a public use is basically a question of fact.
In Linggi v. Garovotti (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 20,24 [286 P.2d 15],
lThe recoupment theory has been roundly condemned in Nichola (2
Nichola on Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1963) 17.5122(3), p. 720): "although sanctioned in countries in which the power of the legislature is
not restricted by a written constitution," recoupment, which "involves
the taking of the property of one person and the sale of it to another for
his own private use," has not been approved in American jurisdictions.
(See also In re Opinion of JUStice8 (1910) 204 Mass. 607 [91 N.E. 405,
27 L.R.A. N.S. 483]; Atwood v. Willacy County Nov. Dist. (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954) 271 S.W.2d 137, 141.)
2As indicated in Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes (1954) 122 Cal.
App.2d 777, 789 [266 P.2d 105], "the more modem courts have enlarged
the traditional definition of public use to include 'public purpose.' "
Thus slum clearance was deemed a public purpose, even though after the
taking and demolition of the slums, redevelopment was to be undertaken
by private industry.
SIn Cincinnati v. Vester (6th Cir. 1929) 33 F.2d 242, 245, an Ohio
statute authorizing excess condemnation was criticized: "If it means
••• that the pl'operty may be taken for the purpose of selling it at a
profit and paying for the improvement, it is clearly invalid. . . • [I)t
violates the due process clause of the Constitution." (Aft'd. in 281 U.S.
439, with the United States Supreme Court refraining from an opinion
on any subject other than compliance with the statute.)

)
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this court approved the rule: "whether, in any individual
case, the use is a public use must be determined by the judiciary from the facts and circumstances of that case." Here
the trial court, after hearing evidence and reviewing the facts,
found that the proposed a<'quisition was not related to any
public use and was therefore constitutionally impermissible.
The state does not complain of an abuse of discretion, or,
indeed, of erroneous conclusions by the trial court; it merely
maintains that no court has the power to review its reliance
on section 104.1. To the contrary, however, this court held in
People v. Chevalier (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 299, 304 [340 P.2d 598],
that the issue of public use is justiciable in eminent domain
proceedings.
Section 104.1, as interpreted by the state, would lack any
definitive standards and thus clearly do violence to the constitutional requirement of due process. The trial court noted in
its memorandum opinion that the state's right-of-way agent,
as a witness, gave as his opinion under the provisions of section 104.1 "the state would hllve a right to take as much as
one thousand acres of private property, even though it was
not for a public use." If a thousand acres, why not 6,000
acres as in Welch, or 10,000 or 100,000 acres' If there is any
limitation whatever on the amount of land the state may take,
without intent to devote it to a public use, neither section
104.1 nor the majority opinion snggests the boundaries. Government's . cavalier treatment of private property rights,
abjectly approved by the majority, evokes apprehension that
Big Brother may have arrived 16 years before 1984.
Amici curiae have complained that the power of the
Department of Public Works to condemn any excess property
without HmJtation becomes a potent weapon to be used against
prospective condemnees who refuse to sell at the price offered
by the department. Right-of-way agents, it is indicated,
demand acquiescence in sale of the desired part of the land at
the proffered price with a threat of a punitive taking of all
the owner's property. This could be disregarded as a fanciful
fear were it not for the state agency's petition for writ of
mandate, which candidly admits that denial of the right of
excess condemnation "will also have important and substantial side effects upon the heretofore successful policy of
petitioner in negotiating the settlement of land acquisitions."
We cannot be oblivious to the "tremendous power in government" and the need for "a growing sensitivity to the
protection of the individual in his relation with govern-
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ment," as Justice Tobriner has written. (Tobriner, Individual R1'ghts in an Industrialized Society (1968) 54 A.B.A.J.
21,22.)
The majority finally propose this doctrine: "the question of
public use turns on a determination of whether the taking is
justified to avoid excessive severance or consequential damages. " This concept is completely wrong. It ignores the key
word: use.
'Condemnation is not a necessary antidote for' excessive
damages, since the law has always been clear that excessive
damages are indefensible in any case and under all circumstances, and a ready remedy by trial and appellate courts is
available. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subds. 5 and 6; Koyer v.
McComber (1938) 12 Cal.2d 175, 182 [82 P.2d 941] [new trial
granted] ; Barrett v. Southern Pac. Co. (1929) 207 Cal. 154,
166 [277 P. 481] [reversal on appeal]; Maede v. Oakland
High School Dist. (1931) 212 Cal. 419, 425 [298 P. 987]
[reduction on appeal] ; 2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (7th
ed. 1960) Torts, § 443, pp. 1636-1637.} Indeed, that the trial
judge was well aware of his responsibility is indicated by his
written memorandum, noting that if excessive severance damages were awarded, the court would "be remiss in its duty :if
it did not reduce whatever amount was excessive." Once the
word "excessive" is eliminated from the majority's rule, we
come to the nub of the problem: the state agency proposes no
use of the property whatever, but merely seeks to avoid paying any severance or consequential damages even though the
law recognizes such damages as being assessable in appropriate cases. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1248, subd. 2; 3 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law (7th ed. 1960) Constitutional Law,
§ 236, p. 2046.)
I would substitute for the majority's rule the following:
the question of public use or purpose turns on a factual determination of what the public agency proposes to do with the
property after acquisition.
Employing that test, the trial court found as a fact that the
property was not being taken for a public use. Since land
speculation is clearly not a public use, the trial court was
correct. I would therefore affirm the order.
. Peters, J;, concurred.
The petition of the real parties in interest for a rehearing
was denied February 28, 1968. Peters, J., and Mosk, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

